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NOTES
A HIGH WATER MARK: THE ARTICLE IV,
SECTION 2, PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES
CLAUSE AND NONRESIDENT BEACH ACCESS
RESTRICTIONS
Susan M. Cordaro*
I sat in the sun and watched the bathers on the beach. They looked
very small. After a while I stood up, gripped with my toes on the
edge of the raft as it tipped with my weight, and dove cleanly and
deeply, to come up through the lightening water, blew the salt water
out of my head, and swam slowly and steadily in to shore.'
INTRODUCTION

From Hemingway2 to the television program Baywatch, our
association between time at the beach and carefree relaxation and
enjoyment is clear. However, because few Americans own property
in oceanfront communities such as Malibu, California, beach access is
a contentious issue on the East and West coasts.
Existing legal doctrine permits implementation of certain barriers
to beach access,' including nonresident restrictions enacted by local
governments to control crowding, cost, or the character of public
beaches? This Note employs the following hypothetical example of
"Beachville" to demonstrate the nature and impact of nonresident
beach access restrictions:
* J.D. Candidate, 2004, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank
Professor Abner Greene for his invaluable assistance from the outset of this project.
As always, there are no sufficient words to thank: my parents, John and Elizabeth,
and my brothers, Greg and Mike, for their constant encouragement and support;
Anne Desmond, for always emphasizing the importance of education; and, of course,
Sean Desmond, for his inspiration and kindness, and for making every day like a day
at the beach.
1. Ernest Hemingway, The Sun Also Rises 238 (Charles Scribner's Sons 1970)
(1926).
2. Id.
3. See infra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.
4. See infra Part I.
5. See infra notes 6-19 and accompanying text.
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Rachel, a resident of a crowded urban neighborhood in State X with
few parks and limited waterfront access, travels for less than one
hour via commuter rail to State Y, planning to spend the day
swimming and relaxing. Rachel walks from the rail station to a
beach owned and operated by the local town of Beachville, carrying
only a bag with her lunch, a book, and a towel on which to sit.
Unbeknownst to Rachel, in response to concerns regarding growing
crowds and the fiscal impact of maintaining the beach, the
Beachville town council has enacted a statute that bars nonresidents
like Rachel from entering the property. She is turned away from the
beach entrance, and returns home frustrated by the wasted trip and
her treatment by residents of the neighboring state.

Similar policies received widespread attention in recent years. For
example, in 1994, Brenden P. Leydon encountered a nonresident
beach access restriction when he attempted to jog past the entrance6
gate of Greenwich Point, a 147-acre town beach in Connecticut.
With its oceanfront location, numerous ponds, pathways, picnic areas
and nature preserve,7 Greenwich Point offered an appealing setting
for exercise on an August day. Because Mr. Leydon did not reside in
the town of Greenwich,' however, the official on duty refused his
entrance to the beach, enforcing an explicit statutory restriction: nonGreenwich residents (other than guests of town residents) could not
"enter, remain upon or use public beaches."9 Because of Leydon's
nonresident status, town officials also denied his subsequent attempts
to obtain beach access permits"' before his successful court challenge
to the restrictions.''
6. Leydon v. Town of Greenwich, 777 A.2d 552, 560 (Conn. 2001); see also David
M. Herszenhorn, Connecticut Court Overturns Residents-Only Beach Policy, N.Y.
Times, July 27, 2001, at B5.
7. Leydon, 777 A.2d at 559.
8. Leydon resided in Stamford, Connecticut. Id. at 560.
9. Id. at 558 n.5 (quoting the challenged provisions of the Greenwich municipal
code).
10. Id. at 560.
I. Leydon filed suit, and, in 2001, the Supreme Court of Connecticut ruled in his
favor, holding that the nonresident restrictions violated the First Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution, as well as parallel state constitutional provisions. Id. at 557. The
trial court had ruled in favor of the Town of Greenwich, rejecting Leydon's commonlaw claims, id. at 563, and finding that Leydon failed to demonstrate that he intended
to engage in the type of expressive activity protected by the First Amendment. Id. at
561-63. Leydon appealed to the Appellate Court, which ruled in his favor, holding
that the nonresident restriction violated state common law requiring municipal parks
to be held in trust rather than only benefiting local residents. Id. at 558 (citing Leydon
v. Greenwich, 750 A.2d 1122 (Conn. 2000)). The Town of Greenwich's petition for
appeal was then granted by the Connecticut Supreme Court. Id. at 559. However,
rather than upholding the Appellate Court's decision based on common-law doctrine,
the Connecticut Supreme Court departed from the practice of resolving common-law
claims before constitutional questions. In the court's view, the common-law public
trust doctrine alone, see infra notes 36-46 and accompanying text, would not provide
nonresident access to the shore, for the "broccoli" shape of the beach area requires
one to pass over the dry portion of the beach to reach the sea. Leydon, 777 A.2d at
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While the Connecticut Supreme Court invalidated the Greenwich
restriction based on the First Amendment and parallel state
constitutional provisions,12 no one legal doctrine currently provides a
conclusive answer to questions of beach access-particularly where
nonresident restrictions are at issue. 3 Under a veritable patchwork of
beach access policies that vary state-by-state, towns continue to
employ nonresident access restrictions ranging from fee differentials
to outright exclusions. 4 The town of Madison, Connecticut, places
financial and logistical obstacles in the way of nonresident access at its
A recent proposal in Manchester-by-the-Sea,
local beach. 5
Massachusetts, would have denied nonresidents and dogs access to
In Manhattan Beach, California, neighborhood
town beaches.'"
residents, angry over mounting trash and noise complaints, proposed
regulations to fence off a dune and require advance parking
reservations in an effort to restrict nonresident access to a public
beach. 7 According to one resident, "[the beach] used to be our little
neighborhood park and now all of Southern California is using it."'"
And, recently, owners of oceanfront property in California
unsuccessfully challenged easements over private land, exacted before

559, 564 n.17. Also, because legislative action could alter the scope of the public trust
doctrine, the court turned to federal First Amendment and state constitutional
principles. Id. at 565 n.20, 565-66.
12. Id. at 557. See infra note 54 for a detailed discussion of the relevant state
constitutional provisions.
13. For example, when presented with First Amendment arguments relating to
nonresident restrictions on beach access, not all courts interpret the scope of
constitutional protections as the Connecticut Supreme Court did in Leydon. See Daly
v. Harris, 215 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1105-09 (D. Haw. 2002) (upholding differential access
fees to a beach in the Hanauma Bay Conservation District). For a discussion of each
court's First Amendment analysis, see infra notes 54-62 and accompanying text.
Further complicating matters, common-law rules such as the public trust doctrine do
not always provide broad access to the sand and shore for nonresident visitors. See
infra Part I.A.
14. See Marc R. Poirier, Environmental Justice and the Beach Access Movements
of the 1970s in Connecticut and New Jersey: Stories of Property and Civil Rights, 28
Conn. L. Rev. 719, 743-47 (1996). Poirier chronicles the efforts to challenge beach
access restrictions in Connecticut, New York, and New Jersey as more towns enacted
exclusionary policies. Id. at 755 n.126; see also Gewirtz v. City of Long Beach, 69
Misc. 2d 763 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972) (describing an attempt to amend city charter to
exclude nonresidents from a public beach).
15. At $10 per person, plus $10 per car, a nonresident family of four would pay
$50 to enter the town beach in Madison-and the passes must be bought at Town
Hall, which is closed on Saturdays and Sundays. Sudhin S. Thanawala, Town Beaches
Still Not So Open, Hartford Courant, Sept. 26, 2002, at B1. As in Greenwich,
Madison closed its beaches to nonresidents prior to the Connecticut Supreme Court's
decision in Leydon v. Town of Greenwich. Id.
16. Community Briefing: Selectmen Reject Parking Sticker, Boston Globe, Sept.
26, 2002, at Globe North 2.
17. Sandra Murillo, A Dust-Up over Sand Dune; Recreation: Manhattan Beach
Residents Call for New Limits, L.A. Times, June 4, 2002, at B4.
18. Id.
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1987, for pedestrian or bicycle access to the public portion of the
beach.' 9
A nonresident's interest in spending a day at the beach and building
sand castles might, at first impression, appear to fall outside the core
protections of the U.S. Constitution. However, state or local actions
that discriminate on the basis of residential status can directly
contradict nation-building constitutional provisions, including the
Article IV, Section 2, Privileges and Immunities Clause.2z" Article IV,
Section 2 protects residents 2' of one state from discriminatory
treatment while temporarily visiting another.22 Courts have employed
the Privileges and Immunities Clause to invalidate statutes ranging
from higher commercial shrimp fishing license fees for nonresidents of
South Carolina,23 to restrictions on nonresident access to medical
services in Georgia.24
Where beach access turns on residential status, Article IV, Section 2
provides a relevant, yet often overlooked, means of defining the legal
limits of nonresident exclusion from activities including public beach
access. While Mr. Leydon, as a citizen of Connecticut, 21 could not
invoke this constitutional provision,2 6 this Note explores the potential
19. Daniel v. County of Santa Barbara, 288 F.3d 375 (9th Cir. 2002) (denying
injunctive relief because Daniel did not seek compensation through appropriate
procedures where the state exercises eminent domain for a public purpose), cert.
denied, 123 S. Ct. 466 (2002). The year 1987 stood as the key date in Daniel because
of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Nollan v. California Coastal
Conm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), which held that exacting an easement over private
property in exchange for a building permit required compensation as a permanent
physical occupation under Takings Clause analysis. Daniel, 288 F.3d at 382. After the
Supreme Court declined to hear an appeal from the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Daniel, a
lawyer for David Geffen, an entertainment executive who had previously filed a
similar suit, stated that he will continue to pursue other claims to defeat efforts by the
California Coastal Commission to provide access to the beach over private property.
David G. Savage & Kenneth R. Weiss, Justices Bolster Beach Access; Supreme Court
Rejects Landowner Claims of Unfair Property Seizure, L.A. Times, Oct. 22, 2002, at
Al; see also Timothy Egan, Owners of Malibu Mansions Cry, This Sand is My Sand,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 25, 2002, at Al (describing ongoing disputes between California
property owners and the California Coastal Commission regarding public beach
access).
20. "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of
Citizens in the several States." U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2. Article IV, Section 2 is also
referred to as the "Comity Clause" or the "Privileges and Immunities Clause." See
John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privilegesor Immunities Clause, 101 Yale L.J. 1385,
1398 (1992).
21. The Supreme Court has come to view "citizen" and "resident" as terms that
are "essentially interchangeable" as part of Article IV, Section 2, Privileges and
Immunities analysis. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 524 n.8 (1978) (quoting Austin
v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 662 n.8 (1975)).
22. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 501 (1999) (citing Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168
(1869)).
23. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
24. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
25. See supra note 8.
26. See United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. City of Camden, 465 U.S. 208
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for a nonresident visitor to the state where a beach is located to put
forth an Article IV, Section 2 claim if faced with a complete bar on
access such as in the "Beachville" hypothetical.
Article IV, Section 2, as applied by the Supreme Court, does not
completely bar disparate treatment. 27 To determine whether Article
IV, Section 2 protects nonresidents who seek to engage in particular
activity, the Court in Baldwin v. Fish & Game Commission
established a threshold test.2' The Baldwin test inquires whether a
regulated activity is "fundamental" to national unity, measured in the
Court's opinion by the activity's
"bearing upon the vitality of the
29
Nation as a single entity.
Considering nonresident beach access restrictions in light of the
Court's holding in Baldwin illuminates the shortcomings of this test,
for it fails to provide for the efficient or effective administration of the
goals of the Privileges and Immunities Clause.3" The threshold test is
inefficient as applied to beach access because it requires local
government officials to predict whether a particular activity may be
deemed "fundamental" in light of limited case law, when governments
are better equipped to focus on the nature of the potential harm
brought by nonresidents and the appropriate means to address that
harm. Moreover, the Baldwin threshold test is ineffective in light of
the history and past application of Article IV, Section 2. As this Note
argues, using the example of beach access restrictions, the threshold
test can exclude activities that are in fact relevant to the Privileges and
Immunities Clause's nation-building objectives.3'
A preferable test for state and local laws that restrict nonresident
access to natural resources would not focus on the "fundamental"
character of the restricted activity. Instead, courts should first
examine whether nonresidents produce a specific harm to a stateowned resource. If a local government quantifies a "peculiar"32 harm

(1984) (finding that under Article IV, Section 2, only out-of-state visitors, not state
residents, could challenge a municipal hiring restriction that favored city residents);
see also infra notes 183-88 and accompanying text.
27. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 502 (citing Toorner, 334 U.S. at 385); Baldwin v. Fish &
Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 383 (1978) (upholding a higher fee structure for
nonresidents seeking a permit to hunt elk in Montana); see also Laurence H. Tribe,
American Constitutional Law § 6-37, at 1262 (3d ed. 2000); Jonathan D. Varat, State
"Citizenship" and Interstate Equality, 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 487, 492 (1981) ("Some, but
not all, public benefits can be reserved for the exclusive or preferential use of the
state's inhabitants. The task of separating which can and cannot be reserved poses
impressive obstacles.").
28. Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 371.
29. Id. at 383, 388.
30. See infra Parts I-Il1.
31. See infra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
32. Toomer, 334 U.S. at 398.
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created by nonresidents, courts should then determine whether the
particular harm justifies the extent of the restriction employed.33
Applying the preferred test, this Note argues that the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 should invalidate
restrictions that completely exclude nonresidents from town beaches
and other state or locally-owned or operated natural resources where
the enacting governmental body fails to demonstrate a substantial
relation between the exclusion and a specific, quantifiable harm
created by nonresidents.34 Further, this Note argues that even under
the Baldwin threshold test, the nonresident restrictions described in
the "Beachville" hypothetical contravene the protections of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause because a total nonresident
exclusion results, as opposed to the minimal fee differential imposed
in Baldwin."

Part I of this Note describes common-law and constitutional
doctrines relating to beach access in order to account for the varying
public access rules among the states that-in many cases-permit the
enactment of nonresident access restrictions. Where state or local
governments treat resident and nonresident access to public resources
differently, Parts II & III of this Note examine the compatibility of
such exclusionary policies with Article IV, Section 2. Part II examines
the history of the Article IV, Section 2, Privileges and Immunities
Clause and details the development of constitutional doctrine under
this provision. Part II also explores the involvement of land resources
and local (rather than state) government in beach access policies and
argues that these factors should not alter the result of Article IV,
Section 2 analysis. Finally, Part II.C determines that the relationship
between Article IV, Section 2 and the Commerce Clause reinforces
the conclusion that nonresident beach access restrictions violate the
Privileges and Immunities Clause, for the objectives of both
provisions include economic and social harmony among residents of
the states under the Constitution.
Part III first demonstrates that even if a privilege and immunity
must be "fundamental" to receive constitutional protection, Article
IV, Section 2 should invalidate restrictions that totally exclude
nonresident access, as opposed to merely imposing a higher
nonresident user fee. Part III concludes by proposing an alternative
to the Baldwin test.
The proposed test examines whether
33. See infra Part III.B.
34. The preferred test proposed in this Note does not entail a dramatic departure
from the second prong of the Court's existing Privileges and Immunities Clause cases
where the activity in question satisfied the Court's threshold test of "fundamental"
rights and activities. See United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. City of Camden,
465 U.S. 208, 222 (1984).
35. Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 388 (1978). For a further
discussion of the distinction between fee differentials and total exclusions, see infra
Part iI.A.3.
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nonresidents would create a distinct, quantifiable harm if given access
to natural areas such as beaches, and whether a restriction excluding
them is substantially related to addressing the specific harm.
I. THE TIDE EBBS AND FLOWS: A STATE-BY-STATE SYSTEM FOR
DETERMINING THE SCOPE OF BEACH ACCESS

In most states, interpretation and application of the common-law
"public trust doctrine" remains the primary measure of the scope of
public beach access. 36 As the discussion that follows in this section
demonstrates, common-law protections vary state-by-state and, in
many cases, permit the enactment of nonresident access restrictions.
A. Statutory and Common-Law Beach Access Rules
In the late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court summarized
the
37
public trust doctrine in Illinois Central RailroadCo. v. Illinois:
It is the settled law of this country that the ownership of and
dominion and sovereignty over lands covered by tide waters, within
the limits of the several States, belong to the respective States within
which they are found, with the consequent right to use or dispose of
any portion thereof, when that can be done without substantial
impairment of the interest of the public in the waters .... 38
As described by the Court, the public trust doctrine derives from
Roman laws that ensured access to the sea and the shore. 39 The
doctrine continues to provide public access to land held in the public
trust for a range of uses, including fishing and navigation in most
states, and recreational swimming in others.4"
The traditional geographic scope of access under the public trust
doctrine extends to the mean high-tide line, so that the area of land
preserved for public use generally includes only the "wet sand"
portion of a beach.4" Where strictly limited to access below the highwater mark, without passage over the land above the high-tide line,
the real impact of the public trust doctrine is limited. However, each

36. See Jack H. Archer et al., The Public Trust Doctrine and the Management of
America's Coasts 19-22 (1994); David C. Slade et al., Putting the Public Trust
Doctrine to Work 4-9 (1990).
37. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
38. Id. at 435.
39. Slade, supra note 36, at 15.
40. See Archer, supra note 36, at 22-25. The public trust doctrine does not protect
recreational swimming in Maine and Massachusetts. Id. at 24-25. However, in
Wisconsin, the public trust doctrine extends to protect even waterskiing. Id. at 24
(citing State v. Village of Lake Delton, 286 N.W.2d 622 (1979)).
41. See id. at 15; see also Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d
355, 360-61 (N.J. 1984).
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state can define additional boundaries in developing and applying the
doctrine in order to broaden its scope.42
In the latter part of the twentieth century, some states adopted
more expansive public access protections than others.43 For example,

the Supreme Court of New Jersey expanded the reach of the public
trust doctrine in that state to the dry sand, recognizing the need to
cross this portion of the beach to access the area below the mean hightide line." The court also granted residents and nonresidents alike the
additional right to rest and play on the beach as an outgrowth of
access to the wet sand and sea.45 In another case, the New Jersey

Supreme Court used the public trust doctrine to strike down a fee
structure that charged nonresidents more than residents for a beach
pass.4"

State legislatures, as well as courts, may broaden the scope of the
public trust doctrine. For example, Oregon enacted legislation to
preserve access to dry sand areas and access paths of which the public
had made "frequent and uninterrupted" recreational use.47 The Texas
Open Beaches Act also provides public access to beaches acquired

through prescription, dedication, or continuous right, and also
prohibits the 4creation of structural barriers that would impede existing
beach access.

Even with legislative and legal options for expanding the scope of
the public trust doctrine, the expansive protections provided in states
such as New Jersey-including access to the dry sand and prohibiting
nonresident discrimination-remain the exception rather than the
norm. Not all states provide broad access to the shore through the
42. Archer, supra note 36, at 13. The Supreme Court confirmed this longstanding
tradition of vesting states with the ability to determine if, and how far, the public trust
doctrine will extend beyond the land covered by the tides in Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 475 (1988).
43. For a state-by-state listing of the scope of common-law protections under the
public trust doctrine, see Slade, supra note 36, at 44-50.
44. See Matthews, 471 A.2d at 365 (holding that the public may access the dry sand
area on privately-held beaches where reasonably necessary to enjoy access to the
water); Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47 (N.J.
1972) (finding that the area upland of the mean high tide line at municipally owned
beaches should be made available to all).
45. Matthews, 471 A.2d at 365 ("Reasonable enjoyment of the foreshore and the
sea cannot be realized unless some enjoyment of the dry sand area is also allowed.").
46. See Neptune City, 294 A.2d at 55-56. But see Poirier, supra note 14, at 805.
Poirier argues that the expansion of the public trust doctrine in New Jersey did not
fully deliver on its potential for expansive beach access, citing ongoing practices in
New Jersey that hinder public use. Id. at 805-06.
47. Or. Rev. Stat. § 390.610 (1994). But see Purdie v. Attorney General, 732 A.2d
442 (N.H. 1999) (holding that a state statute that provided for public access above the
mean high tide line constituted a taking of private property, thereby requiring
compensation).
48. Tex. Nat. Res. Code Ann. § 61.011 (Vernon 2001); see also Moody v. White,
593 S.W.2d 372, 374 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (upholding the Texas Open Beaches Act
and finding a public right to use a beach on Mustang Island).
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public trust doctrine. A 1647 colonial ordinance in Massachusetts
granted ownership of the area between the high and low tide marks to
private parties, limiting public access to the shore. 9 Today, in neither
Massachusetts nor Maine does the public trust doctrine protect access
to the shore for swimming.
B. Beach Access and the FederalConstitution
In states with common law public trust doctrine protections, private
citizens or local governments may still attempt to restrict beach
access.-51 Particularly where municipal government both holds and
maintains oceanfront public property, communities often argue that
only local residents should have a right to beach access. 52 Therefore,
in cases such as Leydon where the scope of the state's public trust
doctrine does not preclude all possible restrictions on access,53 courts
may consider constitutional arguments to invalidate statutes that
prevent individuals from enjoying public property.
In Leydon, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that the
nonresident restrictions enacted in Greenwich violated the First
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and parallel state constitutional
provisions. 54 According to the Connecticut court, Leydon, if admitted
to Greenwich Point, "intended to express himself by conversing with
others on topics of social and political importance."55 Consequently,
the court found the requisite level of expressive activity to proceed in
analyzing the restrictions under the First Amendment. Finding
support in other jurisdictions that considered beaches with park-like
amenities, the court concluded that Greenwich Point constitutes a
49. See Fafard v. Conservation Comm'n, 733 N.E.2d 66, 70 (Mass. 2000).
50. Archer, supra note 36, at 24-25.
51. See supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text.
52. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
53. See supra note 11.
54. Leydon v. Town of Greenwich, 777 A.2d 552 (Conn. 2001). Noting that state
constitutional provisions (Article First, §§ 4, 5, 14) provide "greater protection for
expressive activity than that provided by the first amendment to the federal
constitution," id. at 573, the court analyzed and found the nonresident restriction to
violate both. Id. at 573-75. The sections of Article First of the Connecticut
Constitution cited by the court included: section 4 ("Every citizen may freely speak,
write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of
that liberty."); section 5 ("No law shall ever be passed to curtail or restrain the liberty
of speech or of the press."); and section 14 ("The citizens have a right, in a peaceable
manner, to assemble for their common good, and to apply to those invested with the
powers of government, for redress of grievances, or other proper purposes, by
petition, address or remonstrance."). Conn. Const. art. 1, §§ 4, 5, 14 (West 2001).
55. Leydon, 777 A.2d at 562 n.13 (internal quotations omitted). Particularly, the
court cited Leydon's plan to participate in an interview on the beach with a
newspaper reporter on at least one occasion. Id.
56. Id. at 569-70 (citing Paulsen v. Lehman, 839 F. Supp. 147, 161 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)
(finding Jones Beach State Park to be a "traditional public forum"); Naturist Society,
Inc. v. Fillyaw, 958 F.2d 1515, 1522 (11th Cir. 1992) (concluding that Florida's John D.
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traditional public forum.57 As a traditional public forum, the court
subjected the government's ability to limit expressive activities at
Greenwich Point to the most rigorous forum-based First Amendment
scrutiny, and found that the nonresident restriction was not a
reasonable "time, place, and manner" regulation "narrowly tailored to
serve a significant government interest ... leav[ing] open ample
alternative channels of communication."" s Therefore, the Greenwich
statute violated the U.S. Constitution. 9
However, another court considering whether the First Amendment
precluded differential treatment between state residents and
nonresidents at a public beach reached a different result than the
court in Leydon.6" In a case involving differential fees for nonresident
entrance to the Hanauma Bay Conservation District in Hawaii, a
federal district court declined to consider whether the area constituted
a traditional public forum.6' The court reasoned that conversing with
relatives during a visit to the beach did not reach the requisite level of
expressive activity protected by the First Amendment.6 2
While New Jersey's expansive interpretation of the public trust
doctrine exceeds the protections extended by many states,63
particularly in terms of protecting nonresident access, 4 other legal
doctrines can further define the extent to which'local governments
may discriminate against visitors who seek to enter public beaches.65
MacArthur Beach State Park is a public forum)).
57. Id. at 568.
In places which by long tradition or by government fiat have been
devoted to assembly and debate, the rights of the State to limit expressive
activity are sharply circumscribed .... [Such locations include] streets and
parks which have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public
and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.
Leydon, 777 A.2d at 567 (quoting Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)).
58. Id. at 567-68, 572.
59. Id. at 572-73; see also Warren v. Fairfax County, 196 F.3d 186 (4th Cir. 1999)
(holding that a nonresident restriction in a public mall area in front of a government
office center served no compelling interest and violated the First Amendment).
60. Daly v. Harris, 215 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (D. Haw. 2002).
61. Id. at 1106.
62. Id. ("The contemplated conversation and association for the purposes of
engaging in such conversation, though literally speech and association, do not advance
'knowledge, the transformation of taste, political change, cultural expression, and the
other objectives, values and consequences of the speech that is protected by the First
Amendment." (quoting Swank v. Smart, 898 F.2d 1247, 1251 (7th Cir. 1990))).
63. See supra notes 42-46.
64. See Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47
(N.J. 1972).
65. Other student notes have addressed the question of beach access restrictions,
proposing various approaches to the issue. James Kehoe identified the public trust
doctrine as the preferred solution in response to reductions in beach access, arguing
for its expansion via federal legislation. James M. Kehoe, Note, The Next Wave in
Public Beach Access: Removal of States as Trustees of Public Trust Properties, 63
Fordham L. Rev. 1913 (1995). A 1973 student article discussed dedication, implied
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While some courts have considered whether beach access restrictions
violate the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, disagreement
among jurisdictions as to whether a trip to the beach involves the level
of expression needed to trigger the Amendment's protections
demonstrates that the public forum doctrine, like the public trust
doctrine, may not preclude nonresident beach access restrictions in all
jurisdictions. Accordingly, Part II of this Note explores the Article
IV, Section 2, Privileges and Immunities Clause, a constitutional
provision that Part III concludes should serve to invalidate beach
access restrictions that entirely exclude individuals, based only on
their nonresident status.
II. DIVING IN: THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE
A. The Scope and Objectives of Article IV, Section 2
Some distinctions between residents and nonresidents in terms of
the benefits and burdens of residency in a given state, such as voting
rights, inhere in the federal structure of the United States
government." As one commentator stated, "the framers could not
have intended to incapacitate states totally from disadvantaging
nonresidents because the effect would have been to destroy the
integrity of one of the basic units of the federal system that they
envisioned-the state. ' 7 At the same time, in order to promote trade
and civic relations between residents of the various states, another
objective of the Founding included the need to limit differential
the federal system and to create a
treatment among citizens within
6
1
government.
national
strong
dedication, jus publicum, the public trust doctrine, and application of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as potential means to address
nonresident restrictions on beach access. Note, Public Access to Beaches: Common
Law Doctrines & ConstitutionalChallenges, 48 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 369 (1973). Regarding
the Equal Protection Clause, the note projected that future courts would "more
rigorously appl[y]" prohibitions on arbitrary distinctions among various groups,
including nonresidents of beach communities. Id. at 390-91. However, under Equal
Protection analysis as applied today, nonresident classifications do not undergo
heightened scrutiny. See Varat, supra note 27, at 513-15. Therefore, in terms of
identifying a particular constitutional provision that protects against nonresident
discrimination, the Article IV, Section 2, Privileges and Immunities Clause becomes
relevant. See infra Part l-Ill.
66. See United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. City of Camden, 465 U.S. 208,
218 (1984) (citing Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 383 (1978)).
67. Gary J. Simson, Discrimination Against Nonresidents and the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV, 128 U. Pa. L. Rev. 379, 387 (1979).
68. See infra notes 83-89 and accompanying text; see also Cass R. Sunstein, The
Partial Constitution 25-26 (1993). Sunstein argues that the Constitution's central
provisions, including the Privileges and Immunities Clause, all reflect the need to
prevent "the distribution of resources or opportunities to one group rather than to
another solely on the ground that those favored have exercised the raw political
power to obtain what they want." Id. at 25.
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In an 1869 Supreme Court opinion, Justice Field, discussing Article
IV, Section 2, noted that "no provision in the Constitution has tended
so strongly to constitute the citizens of the United States one people
as this. '6 ' Determining precisely which activities contribute to the
goal of national unity, and which can be reserved for state residents,
frames the underlying challenge of applying the Privileges and
Immunities Clause. As Jonathan Varat writes:
If a state may exclude nonresidents from elementary and secondary
public schools, may it also exclude them from public institutions of
higher education or public hospitals? Even if it may not deny access
entirely, may a state charge a nonresident more for these services
than it charges residents? May a state exclude nonresidents entirely
from, or charge them more for, the use of the state's courts,7 public
parklands, public highways, or public transportation systems?
The limited opportunities that courts have found to analyze what level
of treatment one state must afford7 visiting residents from another
makes this task all the more difficult. '
Questions such as those identified by Varat arise when residents of
one state choose to travel to another state on a temporary basis-for
reasons ranging from a daily commute for employment, to visiting
another state's recreational areas as a weekend traveler. In a 1999
decision, Saenz v. Roe, the Supreme Court described the "right to
travel" as not expressly articulated in 72
the Constitution yet "firmly
embedded" in constitutional protections.
The Court in Saenz distinguished three components of the "right to
travel. ' 73 The first component includes the right of ingress and egress
for a resident of one state traveling to another, the source of which the
Court did not locate in a particular constitutional provision.7 4 The
Court located the second component of the "right to travel" in the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 of the
Constitution, which prevents states from treating unfavorably
residents of other states who visit on a non-permanent basis.7" The
69. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1868); see also Toomer v. Witsell,
334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948) ("The primary purpose of [the Privileges and Immunities
Clause] ... was to help fuse into one Nation a collection of independent, sovereign
States.").
70. Varat, supra note 27, at 492.
71. "[T]he Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV, § 2 of our Constitution...
is not one the contours of' which have been precisely shaped by the process and wear
of constant litigation and judicial interpretation over the years since 1789." Baldwin v.
Fish & Game Comm'n. 436 U.S. 371, 378-79 (1978).
72. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 498 (1999) (internal citations omitted).
73. Id. at 500.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 501. Chief Justice Rehnquist, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justice
Thomas, did not object to use of Article IV, Section 2 to protect temporary visitors to
states other than their place of permanent residence, writing, "Inlonresident visitors
of other States should not be subject to discrimination solely because they live out of'
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Court distinguished temporary visitors from a third category-those
who decide to reside permanently in a new state-for whom the Court
has located an "additional source of protection" in7 7 the Privileges or
76
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Under the second component of the right to travel, derived from
Article IV, Section 2, courts will not uphold restrictions that prevent
nonresident visitors from accessing certain benefits available to
residents, ranging from fishing licenses78 to construction jobs.79 Such
restrictions contradict the right of a resident of State A to be afforded
equal treatment while visiting State B." However, Article IV, Section
2 does not prohibit nonresident discrimination in all areas.'
Therefore, Privileges and Immunities analysis must inquire whether
the Constitution protects a particular benefit from state policies that
exclude nonresidents visiting from another state. 2 In order to
conduct such an analysis, however, this Note first discusses the history
of Article IV, Section 2, then provides an overview of its application
by various courts.

State." Id. at 512-13 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The dissent issued by Rehnquist
instead focused on the Court's use of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to protect individuals who relocate permanently to another
state. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 502-03. In Saenz, the Court invalidated a California statute that placed a
cap on the amount of welfare benefits new residents of the state could receive, finding
that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects new
arrivals (whose "bona fides" of citizenship are unquestioned) against discrimination
in accessing benefits for consumption in that state. Id. at 505. The Court's use of the
Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause in Saenz caused some
speculation regarding the scope of a potential "revival" since conventional wisdom
after the Slaughter-House Cases held that the Clause was not a likely candidate for
resolving constitutional questions. Laurence Tribe, however, argues that the decision
did not announce a major change of course in the Court's view of the Clause, but
instead reflected the Court's comfort and interest in framing issues in terms of the
structures of federalism. See Laurence H. Tribe, Saenz Sans Prophecy: Does the
Privileges or Immunities Revival Portend the Future-Or Reveal the Structure of the
Present?, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 110 (1999); see also Tim A. Lemper, The Promise and
Perils of "Privileges or Immunities": Saenz v. Roe, 23 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y. 295,
320-21 (1999) ("Saenz may afford a reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause
which advances the Rehnquist Court's constitutional vision without inaugurating a
new era of fundamental rights 'privileges or immunities' jurisprudence.").
77. This Note, in accordance with the language of the Constitution and the vast
majority of academic works on the subject, refers to the Article IV provision as the
Privileges and Immunities Clause, and the Fourteenth Amendment provision as the
Privileges or Immunities Clause.
78. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
79. United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. City of Camden, 465 U.S. 208
(1984).
80. See Toomer, 334 U.S. at 395.
81. See Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978) (upholding a
higher fee structure for nonresidents seeking a permit to hunt elk in Montana).
82. Id. at 388.
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1. The Ratification and Purpose of Article IV, Section 2
Article IV of the Articles of Confederation is a close relative of
Article IV, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution. 3 The lineage of Article
IV, Section 2 traces back even further, to pre-Revolutionary colonial
charters that permitted colonists to retain legal privileges on par with
those who remained in England while in America or other British
colonies. 4 David Bogen contends that while the charters retained for
colonists the rights they enjoyed in England to encourage colonialism,
the purpose of such protections shifted with enactment of the Articles
of Confederation to preserve a "common nationality" after
independence from the king."
When delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1787 adopted
Article IV, Section 2, they did not transcribe the language of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause directly from the Articles of
Confederation. 6 Reference to "free inhabitants '"87 was changed to
"citizens," express language regarding free ingress and egress among
the states 8 disappeared entirely, and the regulation of interstate
commerce was transferred to the new federal government. 9
83. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 501 (1999). Article IV of the Articles of
Confederation provided in part:
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse
among the people of the different states in this union, the free inhabitants of
each of these states, paupers, vagabonds and fugitives from justice excepted,
shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several
states; and the people of each state shall have free ingress and regress to and
from any other state, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and
commerce, subject to the same duties, impositions and restrictions as the
inhabitants thereof respectively, provided that such restriction shall not
extend so far as to prevent the removal of property imported into any state,
to any other state, of which the Owner is an inhabitant ....
Articles of Confederation art. IV.
84. The Virginia Charter provided: "[A]II and every the Persons being our
Subjects, which shall dwell and inhabit within ... the said several Colonies . . . shall
HAVE and enjoy all Liberties, Franchises, and Immunities, within any of our other
Dominions ....
David S. Bogen, The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV,
37 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 794, 796-97 (1987) (citing The Federal and State
Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws of the States, Territories,
and Colonies Now or Heretofore Forming the United States of America 3788 (F.
Thorpe ed., 1909)); see also Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 79 n.9 (1982) (O'Connor,
J., concurring) ("The Rhode Island Charter gave members of that Colony the right 'to
passe and repasse with freedome .... ' (citing Z. Chafee, Three Human Rights in the
Constitution of 1787, at 177 (1956))).
85. Bogen, supra note 84, at 817.
86. For the text of Article IV of the Articles of Confederation, see supra note 83.
87. Articles of Confederation art. IV. For the text of Article IV of the Articles of
Confederation, see supra note 83.
88. Articles of Confederation art. IV. For the text of Article IV of the Articles of
Confederation, see supra note 83.
89. "The Congress shall have Power To ... regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States .... " U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8; see also Baldwin v.
Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 379-80 (1978) ("[Sleparation [of the Privileges
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The Clause received limited attention during the Convention's
debates-the discussion that did occur focused primarily on the
requirements of citizenship, rather than exploring the nature or scope
of the "privileges and immunities" protected. 9" Debate on the Clause
did not broaden during the iatification process. James Madison
referred to the Clause in The Federalist as an example of the
Constitution's improvement on the Articles of Confederation, for, he
argued, prior language regarding "free inhabitants" possessed "a
confusion of language here which is remarkable."9' 1 Not until the
nineteenth century did courts begin to define the extent and nature of
protection provided by the term privileges and immunities. 92
2. Article IV, Section 2 and the Supreme Court
A recurring debate among scholars and courts interpreting the
Privileges and Immunities Clause focuses on whether Article IV,
Section 2 embodies protections for rights defined by "natural law" or
whether the Clause measures protections only by the particular
positive legal rights provided by law to residents of the visited state.
The first part of this section addresses the natural law arguments put
forth to support the view that the Privileges and Immunities Clause
embodies and protects certain rights that derive from individual
liberty and a democratic structure of government. Part II.A.L.b then
compares a different view of the Clause, adopted by modern courts,
that limits its protection to certain benefits of residence created by law
in each state.
Part II.A.l.c reviews the Court's application of Article IV, Section
2. The final sections of Part II explore the relationship between the
Privileges and Immunities Clause and other legal doctrines, including
the dormant Commerce Clause and the involvement of state-owned
This section concludes that while the modern antiproperty.
discrimination interpretation of Article IV, Section 2 is appropriate,
examining beach access restrictions under the "fundamental"
activities test employed by courts to determine which state-conferred
privileges and immunities fall within the scope of protection
demonstrates the weaknesses of the Court's test in Baldwin.
and Immunities Clause and the Commerce Clause] may have been an assurance
against an anticipated narrow reading of the Commerce Clause."); Bogen, supra note
84, at 835-36.
90. Bogen, supra note 84, at 837-38 (citing Notes of Debates in the Federal
Convention of 1787 Reported by James Madison 439 (A. Koch ed. 1966)); see also
Simson, supra note 67, at 384 ("[I]t seems reasonable to infer that familiar
principles-specifically, those spelled out in the provision of the Articles of
Confederation on which the clause plainly was based-were widely understood to
inform the clause.").
91. Bogen, supra note 84, at 840 n.118 (quoting The Federalist No. 42, at 269-71
(James Madison) (J. Cooke ed., 1961)).
92. See id. at 841.
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a. The "Natural Law" View
Some commentators argue that Article IV, Section 2 encompasses
rights defined by larger principles of free society, rather than merely
establishing a basic comity between residents and nonresidents in light
of state-created rights." Proponents of the natural law view include
Chester James Antieau, who argues that the Supreme Court has
"perverted" the intended objectives of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause, "whose purpose was to protect the natural, basic, fundamental
rights" of those "sojourning" in a state other than their own.94
Another commentator, Christopher Maynard, points to Alexander
Hamilton's FederalistNo. 80 as "implicitly" viewing the Privileges and
Immunities Clause as a protection for rights found in natural law.95
Maynard cites Hamilton's argument that the federal judiciary, rather
than the states, would best enforce "fundamental rights" encompassed
in provisions such as Article IV, Section 2.9'
By most accounts, the first case to present a comprehensive analysis
of the scope of rights protected under the Clause, Corfield v. Coryell,97
embraced the natural rights approach.
In Corfield, the plaintiff
challenged a New Jersey state law that excluded nonresidents of the
state from gathering oysters in the state's waters unless on a boat
owned by a state resident.9 9 Justice Bushrod Washington, on circuit,
93. See, e.g., Chester James Antieau, Paul's Perverted Privileges or the True
Meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article Four, 9 Win. & Mary L.
Rev. 1 (1967). Antieau traces this meaning to a widespread belief in natural rights
among those who wrote and ratified the Articles of Confederation and the
Constitution. Id. at 7; see also Douglas G. Smith, Natural Law, Article IV, and Section
One of the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 Am. U. L. Rev. 351, 359 (1997) ("The
Clause ...went beyond principles of comity, making the citizens of the several states
one people and creating positive, conventional obligations in the place of 'unwritten'
principles of reason that served as legal default rules.").
94. Antieau, supra note 93, at 1.
95. Christopher S. Maynard, Nine-Headed Caesar: The Supreme Court's ThumbsUp Approach to the Right To Travel, 51 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 297, 336 (2000).
96. Id. at 336-37.
97. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).
98. See Bogen, supra note 84, at 841-42 ("One of the earliest judicial opinions
considering the privileges and immunities clause of article IV identified them with
fundamental natural law rights."); see also Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S.
371, 381 (quoting Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 511 (1939)); Tribe, supra note 27, § 636, at 1252. However, despite the widespread understanding that the case stood for a
natural rights interpretation of privileges and immunities, not all commentators agree.
See, e.g., Harrison, supra note 20, at 1400 n.48 ("Justice Washington meant to
embrace the comity reading."); Nicole 1.Hyland, Note, On the Road Again: How
Much Mileage Is Left on the Privileges or Immunities Clause and How Far Will It
Travel?, 70 Fordham L. Rev. 187, 207 (2001). Hyland writes: "Justice Washington's
opinion has been criticized for interpreting the Privileges and Immunities Clause as a
rights-creating provision. A more plausible reading of the Corfield passage, however,
is that Article IV,Section 2 did not create these rights, but merely granted protection
to interstate travelers with respect to these rights." Id.
99. Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 550.
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rejected the argument that the right of residents of New Jersey to
gather oysters should apply equally to a nonresident in that state.""
Instead, in an often-cited passage, Justice Washington stated:
We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those
privileges and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental;
which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments; and
which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several
states which compose this Union, from the time of their becoming
free, independent and sovereign.""
Justice Washington went on to describe the scope of such privileges
and immunities as "more tedious than difficult to enumerate.""' 2
However, Washington did outline a general range of rights within the
Clause, including "protection by the government; the enjoyment of
life and liberty ...the right to acquire and possess property... to
pursue and obtain happiness and safety... [and] to pass through, or
to reside in any other state."' 3
Modern jurisprudence and other commentators reject an
interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause based on
natural law protections, arguing that the authors of the Articles of
Confederation intended the measure of "privileges and immunities"
to be found in a particular state, not in an "abstraction" among the
states. "'4
b. The Modern View: Article IV, Section 2 as an Anti-Discrimination
Clause
The Supreme Court's modern interpretation rejects the view that
natural rights define the protections of Article IV, Section 2. An 1868
case, Paul v. Virginia,"5 and the 1872 Slaughter-House Cases,'06 mark
the Supreme Court's departure from viewing Article IV, Section 2 as
a provision embodying natural law protections.
In Paul, while upholding a Virginia statute that discriminated
against corporations of other states because corporations are not
"citizens," the Court expressly removed the link between rights
protected under Article IV, Section 2 and natural law."" Justice Field
wrote that "[s]pecial privileges enjoyed by citizens in their own States
are not secured in other States by this provision.""...
Instead, he
argued, the Clause was intended to promote national unity by putting
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 552.
Id. at 551.
Id.
Id. at 551-52.
Bogen, supra note 84, at 843.
75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
Paul, 75 U.S. at 180.
Id.
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"the citizens of each State on the same footing with citizens of other
States" in terms of the "advantages resulting from citizenship."""
Five years later, the Court in Slaughter-House again stated that the
rights granted by a state to its own citizens were "the measure of the
rights of citizens within [its] jurisdiction."'"'
In terms of the
protections of privileges "or" immunities included in the Fourteenth
Amendment, Justice Miller's majority opinion limited the reach of
this clause to only those "privileges and immunities... which owe
their existence to the Federal government, its National character, its
Constitution, or its laws."'''
After Slaughter-House, both Article IV's Privileges and Immunities
Clause and the Privileges or Immunities Clause in the Fourteenth
Amendment played only minor roles in constitutional jurisprudence
as "narrower anti-discrimination" provisions.' 2 According to the
Court, Article IV, Section 2 does not measure the rights of
nonresidents in terms of natural rights nor the rights nonresidents

109. Id.
110. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 77; see also Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 511
(1939) (describing as "the settled view" that Article IV, Section 2 does not import the
privileges of a citizen in her home state to another).
11. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 79. Justice Miller's characterization of the scope
and intent of the Privileges or Immunities Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment has
been criticized for being "flatly inconsistent with the history of its framing in Congress
and its ratification by the state legislatures." William E. Nelson, The Fourteenth
Amendment: From Political Principle to Judicial Doctrine 163 (1988). Nelson argues
that those debating and ratifying the Amendment understood the Privileges or
Immunities Clause to extend common-law property and contract protections to
African-Americans, as well as whites from the North who relocated to the South, and
that the Clause was intended to protect certain "basic rights" although the scope of
such protections was not made definitive. Id.; see also Robert J. Kaczorowski, The
Politics of Judicial Interpretation: The Federal Courts, Department of Justice and
Civil Rights, 1866-1876, at 153 (1985) ("[Justice Miller's] assertion that the primacy of
state authority over the natural rights of citizens was well established and recognized
is contradicted by the predominant antebellum view of citizenship and the post-Civil
War judicial interpretations of citizenship under the Reconstruction Amendments.").
While the Supreme Court surprised the legal community by relying on the
Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause to protect the right to
relocate permanently in a new state in Saenz v. Roe, the Court emphasized that this
signaled no radical change in its Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence: "Despite
fundamentally differing views concerning the coverage of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, most notably expressed in the
majority and dissenting opinions in the Slaughter-House Cases, it has always been
common ground that this Clause protects the third component [deciding to reside
permanently in a new state] of the right to travel." Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 503
(1999) (internal citations omitted). Other commentators agree that Saenz did not
signal a major shift in the Court's decisions involving privileges and immunities. See
supra note 76.
112. See Lemper, supra note 76, at 297; see also Maynard, supra note 95, at 341
(arguing that the "anti-discrimination rationale effectively read the [Fourteenth
Amendment] Privileges or Immunities Clause out of the Constitution, because the
Equal Protection Clause also prohibits discrimination."); Hyland, supra note 98, at
204.
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possess in their home state."3
Instead, Article IV, Section 2
establishes a basic parity of treatment between nonresident visitors
and residents in a given state, with exceptions for certain benefits that
remain outside the scope of protected privileges and immunities.
The following section outlines the tests employed by the Court to
determine which activities are protected by the Privileges and
Immunities Clause. Where states do attempt to discriminate, courts
must determine whether the Privileges and Immunities Clause
requires a benefit retained for state residents to be shared with
nonresidents.
In the twentieth century, the Supreme Court
considered several state statutes that discriminated against
nonresidents." 4 Nevertheless, the Court did not develop an entirely
consistent framework for determining whether the right to engage in a
particular activity can in fact be reserved for those actually residing in
a particular state.
A threshold test to determine whether Article IV, Section 2 applies
to a particular activity emerged in Baldwin v. Fish & Game
Commission."5 After an overview of the modern Article IV, Section 2
cases preceding and following Baldwin, this Note examines the
Court's threshold test, which asks whether a particular right or activity
is "fundamental" to national unity."' Part III presents a critique of
the "fundamental" rights and activities test, and describes and applies
a preferred alternative to nonresident beach access restrictions.
c. Twentieth-Century Privilegesand Immunities Analysis: A
"Fundamental" Rights and Activities Test Emerges
In 1948, in Toomer v. Witsell, the Court applied the Privileges and
Immunities Clause to invalidate South Carolina statutes that charged
nonresidents a $2500 per boat commercial shrimp fishing license fee
(while residents paid only $25)."' The Court in Toomer described the
Privileges and Immunities Clause as "designed to insure to a citizen of
State A who ventures into State B the same privileges which the
citizens of State B enjoy.""'
However, the Court conceded that
Article IV, Section 2 did not prohibit all instances of nonresident
discrimination.' 19

113. See supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
114. See infra notes 117-38 and accompanying text.
115. 436 U.S. 371, 383, 388 (1978).
116. Id. at 383.
117, Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 389 (1948). The Court found the fee
differentials in South Carolina to be so extreme that, for all intents and purposes,
nonresidents were excluded from fishing. See infra Part II.A.3.
118. Id. at 395.
119. Id. at 396 ("Like many other constitutional provisions, the privileges and
immunities clause is not an absolute.").
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Accordingly, the Court created a test establishing the boundaries of
such exceptions to ensure that "valid independent" reasons beyond
nonresident status supported disparate treatment: "the inquiry in each
case must be concerned with whether such reasons do exist and
whether the degree of discrimination bears a close relation to
them."' 2 1 In the case of commercial shrimp fishing, the Court rejected
South Carolina's rationale for discriminating against nonresidentsthe risk of over-harvesting-because nonresidents do not use different
equipment or methods that would contribute to resource depletion in
a manner disproportionate to state residents. 2' Therefore, applying
its test, the Court found no reasonable relationship between South
Carolina's virtual exclusion
of nonresidents and the state's rationale
2
for enacting the statute.
The Court applied the Toomer test inconsistently, if at all, in
subsequent cases involving Article IV, Section 2 challenges. Within a
one-month period of 1978, for example, the Court took diverging
approaches to resolving privileges and immunities claims in two
separate cases.
In May 1978, the Court decided Baldwin v. Fish & Game
Commission, upholding a Montana statute that required nonresidents
of the state to pay higher fees than residents for elk-hunting
licenses. 2 ' Justice Blackmun's majority opinion first emphasized that
recreational, rather than commercial, hunting was at issue, as well as
the expense of managing the state's elk population. 24 Further, the
Court noted that the statute imposed a higher fee rather than entirely
excluding nonresidents from hunting in Montana. 5
Stressing the role of Article IV, Section 2 in promoting national
unity and a "norm of comity,"' 2u ' Blackmun further described the
outlying boundaries of the Clause-areas where residents and
nonresidents are distinguished, such as voting, eligibility for elected
office, and other "services" that need not be made available on an
equal basis.2 7 Adding a threshold step to the inquiry described in
Toomer,"' Blackmun concluded, "[o]nly with respect to those
'privileges' and 'immunities' bearing upon the vitality of the Nation as

120. Id. (citations omitted). The Court added that in applying this test, courts
should give "due regard for the principle that the States should have considerable
leeway in analyzing local evils and in prescribing appropriate cures." Id.
121. Id. at 398-99.
122. Id. at 403.
123. Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978).
124. Id. at375 n.1l.
125. Id. at 388. For a discussion of the distinction between differential fees and
nonresident exclusion under Article IV, Section 2, see infra Part II.A.3.
126. Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 380-82 (citations omitted).
127. Id. at 383.
128. See supra text accompanying note 120.

2003]

HIGH WATER MARK

2545

a single entity must129 the State treat all citizens, resident and
nonresident, equally.'
Applying this test to recreational hunting where appellants were
neither deprived of their livelihood nor precluded from travel within
Montana, the Court concluded that "[w]hatever rights or activities
may be 'fundamental' under the Privileges and Immunities Clause ...
elk hunting by nonresidents... is not one of them."'3
Dissenting, Justice Brennan hypothesized that a natural rights view
grounded in Corfield's reference to "fundamental" rights influenced
the Court's analysis of the Montana statute. 131 Instead, Brennan
would have rejected an examination of whether a right is
"fundamental" because this inquiry has "no place in our analysis of
whether a State's discrimination against nonresidents ... violates the
Clause."' 32
Brennan proposed returning to a framework that focuses on why a
particular state has acted to discriminate against nonresidents.
Disparate treatment would be allowed where nonresidents cause the
problem that the state targets, and where the discrimination bears a
substantial relation to the problem created by nonresidents.'33
Just one month later, Justice Brennan's opinion for a unanimous
Court in Hicklin v. Orbeck applied the test he proposed in Baldwin.'34
In Hicklin, the Court called Toomer the "leading modern exposition
of the limitations the [Article IV, Section 2, Privileges and
Immunities] Clause places on a State's power to bias employment
opportunities in favor of its own residents."'1'5 Examining an "Alaska
Hire" statute, 3 ' which gave hiring preferences to Alaska residents
over nonresidents, the Court determined that nonresidents were not
the "peculiar source of the evil" identified by the state-high
unemployment levels. 37
Therefore, the state's justification
for
3
discrimination was not sufficient to uphold the statute. 1

129. Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 383 (emphasis added).
130. Id.at 388.
131. 1d. at 396-97 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 402 (Brennan, J.,dissenting). Brennan pointed to several cases
examined by the Court under Article IV, Section 2 where a particular right was not
first examined to determine its fundamentality, id. at 401, such as Toomer and Doe v.
Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (holding that individuals must be afforded equal access to
medical services when visiting a state in which they do not reside).
133. Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 402.
134. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978) (invalidating an Alaska law that gave
hiring and firing preferences to state residents over nonresidents).
135. Id. at 525 (emphasis added).
136. Id. at 520 n.1 (citing Alaska Stat. Ann. §§ 38.40.010-.090 (1977)).
137. Id. at 527 (internal quotations omitted).
138. Id. at 527-28.
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d. The Status and Shortcomings of the "Fundamental" Privilegesand
Immunities Test
What is the status of the "fundamental" activity test today? At no
point did the Court in Hicklin discuss whether the right in questionthe right to seek employment opportunities-is "fundamental,"
defined by its relationship to "the vitality of the Nation as a single
entity."' 39 However, where Baldwin emphasized the recreational
nature of elk-hunting in differentiating between those rights that are
"fundamental" and those that do not demand comity, 4 " the Court's
prior and subsequent case law' 4 ' indicate that the commercial
character of the Alaska Hire statute would likely bring it within the
realm of Article IV, Section 2 protection if the fundamentality test
were applied. 4 2 While the Court did not examine the "fundamental"
nature of the right in question in Hicklin, the opinion did not contain
the definitive statement rejecting such a test once and for all that
Justice Brennan advocated in Baldwin.
In later cases, the Court referenced the test of "fundamental" rights
in some instances, but not in others. In 1982, in a concurring opinion
in Zobel v. Williams, Justice O'Connor proposed locating all cases
involving the "right to travel" in Article IV, Section 2."1 Moreover,
O'Connor wrote that the test described in Baldwin should apply to
questions concerning the right to travel.'44 In 1984, the Court
examined a municipal construction hiring ordinance under Article IV,
Section 2, and applied the Baldwin threshold test to find employment
"fundamental" to national unity.4 5 Four years later, in a 1988
decision finding that Virginia's bar residency requirement violated the
Privileges and Immunities Clause, seven Justices joined an opinion
applying Baldwin's two-step test, including the first step examining
139. Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 383 (1978).
140. Id. at 388.
141. See infra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
142. See infra Part iI.B (regarding the link between Article IV, Section 2's antidiscrimination protections and the dormant Commerce Clause). In Hicklin, the Court
indicated that while the appellants did not challenge the statute on Commerce Clause
grounds, "the mutually reinforcing relationship between the Privileges and
Immunities Clause ...and the Commerce Clause ...renders several Commerce
Clause decisions appropriate support for our conclusion." Hicklin, 437 U.S. at 531-32.
143. Zabel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 76 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (finding
that a state statute inappropriately based distribution of proceeds from oil rights on
duration of state residence).
144. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor wrote:
If the Privileges and Immunities Clause applies to Alaska's distribution
system, then our prior opinions describe the proper standard of review....
[I]f the nonresident engages in conduct that is not "fundamental" because it
does not "bea[r] upon the vitality of the Nation as a single entity," the
Privileges and Immunities Clause affords no protection.
Id. (citing Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 387, 383).
145. United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. City of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 219,
222 (1984).
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whether the activity
bears sufficiently on the "vitality of the Nation as
146
a single entity.
In Saenz v. Roe, while resolving the case on Fourteenth
Amendment grounds, the majority opinion discussed Article IV,
Section 2 as prohibiting discrimination where "there is no substantial
reason for the discrimination beyond the mere fact that [those
discriminated against] are citizens of other States.' 47 The Court's
only mention of "fundamental" rights, without additional explanation,
came in a footnote, citing Corfield, that parenthetically referred to
"fundamental rights protected by the Privileges and Immunities
of one state to pass
Clause" that "include the right of a citizen
48
through, or to reside in any other state.'
Recent Article IV, Section 2 cases that do not examine whether a
right is "fundamental" involve commercial activity that would likely
satisfy the Court's test as applied previously.'49 Therefore, the Court
offers no definitive reason to believe that the threshold
"fundamental" test does not remain on "stand-by" for analysis when a
new nonresident restriction arises for consideration, such as beach
access.
Numerous commentators share the concerns regarding the
"fundamental" rights and activities test articulated by Justice Brennan
in his dissent in Baldwin. 1 " In lieu of the threshold test, David Bogen
would prohibit differential treatment unless there is a valid reason for
denying nonresidents the rights afforded "state natives."' 5' Gary
Simson finds that the test contradicts the original purpose of Article
IV, Section 2,1"2 while Jonathan Varat challenges the Court's finding
146. Supreme Court of Va. v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59, 64 (1988) (internal quotations
and citations omitted): see also Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985)
(holding that New Hampshire's bar residency requirement violates the Privileges and
Immunities Clause).
147. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502 (1999) (quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S.
385, 396 (1948)).
148. Id. at 501 n.14 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F.
Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230) (Washington, Circuit Judge)).
149. See Lunding v. N.Y. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S. 287, 315 (1998) (finding a
New York tax law provision to violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause because
the state failed to show a substantial reason for refusing to allow nonresidents to
deduct alimony payments). However, not all decisions protecting out-of-state visitors
from discrimination focus on the commercial nature of the activity in question. In
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), the Supreme Court held that states could not
restrict access to medical care, including abortion services, to state residents.
Arguably, paying for hospital services is a commercial activity, but the Court
appeared more concerned with a restriction on access to medical care than the impact
on trade if nonresidents could not seek treatment in Georgia. According to the
Court, "a contrary holding would mean that a State could limit to its own residents
the general medical care available within its borders. This we could not approve." Id.
at 200.
150. See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
15t. See Bogen, supra note 84, at 857-58.
152. See Simson, supra note 67, at 385.
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that certain activities fall outside of the Clause's nation-building
objectives. Varat writes:
[T]he idea that disadvantaging nonresidents more than is necessary
to compensate for any peculiar problems they pose will "frustrate
the purposes of the formation of the Union" only when the
disadvantage affects a fundamental activity reflects either an unduly
limited view of what those purposes
are, or an empirically dubious
53
assumption about human nature.1
And, summarizing the underlying sentiment of those who would reject
terms the
the Court's threshold inquiry, Laurence Tribe
15 4
"unsatisfactory."
test
activities
or
rights
"fundamental"
Part Ill of this Note employs the example of nonresident beach
access restrictions to support the criticism put forth by these
commentators regarding the Court's "fundamental" activities test in
Baldwin. Activities such as beach access, which appear "recreational"
in character, may therefore escape Article IV, Section 2 analysis
under the Court's test as applied in Baldwin. However, as this Note
argues, beach access involves substantial issues that lie at the core of
the Clause's nation-building objectives, from economic activity to the
sharing of resources and the interaction of diverse populations. In
particular, beach access restrictions contradict Article IV, Section 2
where governments enact total exclusions, as opposed to
resident/nonresident fee differentials.
3. Distinguishing Bans on Nonresident Access from Differential User
Fees
In order to better understand the underlying problems created by
the Court's "fundamental" activities test, an important distinction
must be drawn between restrictions that entirely block nonresident
access to a service or activity and fee differentials. Prior Supreme
Court cases treat total bans less favorably than fee differentials and
thereby demonstrate that the extent of the government-enacted ban
provides a better measure of threats to national unity than does an
inquiry into the nature of the regulated activity.
In Baldwin, the Court noted that the higher license fee charged for
elk hunting by nonresidents did not constitute a total exclusion,
without stating what result such an exclusion would have on the
outcome of the case.151 In cases where a total exclusion existed rather
than a fee differential, from denying nonresident access to abortion

153. Varat, supra note 27, at 511.
154. Tribe, supra note 27, § 6-37, at 1269 ("One highly unsatisfactory way [to
resolve the limits of the Privileges and Immunities Clause] is to restrict the clause to a
list of l'undamental' privileges- as the Court did in Baldwin.").
155. See Baldwin v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 388 (1978).
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services 151 to residency requirements for the practice of law, 157 the
Court consistently invalidated complete bans on access. In Toomer v.
Witsell, the Court struck down a fee differential that it defined as so
extreme that the "practical effect is virtually exclusionary."''
Therefore, the Court analyzed the South Carolina statute as though it
were a total exclusion. 5 9 However, the Court in Toomer noted that its
holding would not preclude a state from passing along the cost of
additional conservation or enforcement measures to nonresidents via
16
graduated license fees. 0
In one attempt to use the Privileges and Immunities Clause to
challenge differential pricing between residents and nonresidents for
beach access, in Daly v. Harris,the U.S. District Court for the District
of Hawaii held that nonresidents could in fact be required to pay $3
for access to the beach at Hanauma Bay when residents could enter
for free.' 6'
The plaintiffs argued that the fee interfered with
"fundamental" rights, including the right to access a public forum, the
"right to intrastate travel," and the right to access the Hawaii
shoreline.161 Of the rights the plaintiffs put forth, the court found
none sufficiently "fundamental" to fall within the scope of Article IV,
63
Section 2 protections, or other constitutional provisions.
In Daly, however, the distinction between residents and
nonresidents concerned a fee differential 64 rather than the outright
6' 5
ban on nonresident access at Greenwich Point and in "Beachville.'
While the opinions in Daly and Baldwin did not indicate what result
156. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
157. Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985).
158. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396-97 (1948).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 398-99.
161. Daly v. Harris, 215 F. Supp. 2d 1098,1102 (D. Haw. 2002).
162. Id. at 1110.
163. Id. at 1110-11. The court deemed a right "fundamental" when it "bear[s] upon
the vitality of the Nation as a single entity." Id. at 1110 (quoting Baldwin v. Fish &
Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 383 (1978)). The court subsequently found that "access
to the beach" did not fall within the class of protected "fundamental" rights. Id. at
1111-12. In examining the remaining arguments put forth by plaintiffs, the court
examined the plaintiffs' challenge regarding the right to "intrastate" travel and the
right to access the shore of Hawaii under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 1112. Additionally, the court examined and rejected
the claimed right to access a public forum under the First Amendment rather than
Article IV, Section 2. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
164. Daly, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 1102.
165. See Leydon v. Town of Greenwich, 777 A.2d 552, 559 (Conn. 2001). Courts in
two other states that have considered fees for beach access under the public trust
doctrine permit their use if the fees are reasonable, if the money collected benefits the
beach area, and so long as nonresidents were charged no more than residents. See
Archer, supra note 36, at 107 (citing City of Dayton Beach Shores v. State, 483 So. 2d
405 (Fla. 1985) and Neptune City v. Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47 (N.J. 1972)).
Under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, Gary Simson would uphold fee
differentials so far as they do not "exceed the sum essential to compensate the state's
taxpayers for payments made in nonresidents' behalf." Simson, supra note 67, at 399.
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would occur with total exclusions in place, prior cases indicate that a
different kind of restriction on the same underlying activity would lead,
at a minimum, to a more rigorous analysis, if not a different
outcome.' 66 For this reason, this Note argues that the protections
offered by Article IV, Section 2 should relate directly to the level of
the differential treatment extended by local governments, measured
against the justification for the restriction, rather than examining the
right or activity in question. Therefore, Part III examines fee
differentials and total bans in the beach access context, and
determines that local governments will, in many cases, justify
reasonable fee differentials. However, total exclusions, such as in the
"Beachville" hypothetical, should not survive the Article IV, Section 2
inquiry.
B. Article IV, Section 2: A Close Relative of the Commerce Clause
As descendants of Article IV of the Articles of Confederation," 7
the Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Commerce Clause 6 ' are
linked both historically and in case law. The specific relationship
between the Clauses relates to the scope of the "dormant" Commerce
Clause doctrine, which precludes states in many cases from acting in a
manner that interferes with interstate commerce."' As this section
demonstrates, dormant Commerce Clause analysis could apply to
nonresident restrictions where residents of one state are given
preferential access to a natural resource, such as a public beach, over
residents of another. However, even if application of the Commerce
Clause does not extend to invalidate exclusionary beach access
policies, this line of cases reinforces a finding under Article IV,
Section 2 that activities that appear to be exclusively recreational in
nature invoke the nation-building principles from which both clauses
derive, and which nonresident exclusions contradict.

166. See supra notes 155-59 and accompanying text.
167. Seesupra Part II.A.1.
168. "The Congress shall have Power... [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States .... " U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
169. No specific provision of the Constitution expressly prohibits state action that
interferes with interstate commerce, yet such a prohibition is implied from the
structure of government and the Article I, section 8 grant of power to Congress to
regulate Interstate Commerce. See S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945); see
also Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 298 (1851) (recognizing limitations
on state regulatory power in light of the constitutional grant of power to Congress to
regulate commerce). State action that ."clearly discriminates against interstate
commerce' and lacks a non-protectionist justification will be invalidated under the
Court's current application of the dormant Commerce Clause. Tribe, supra note 27, §
6-2, at 1031 (citing Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454-55 (1992)). In addition,
a "facially neutral" law must be examined to compare the burden the regulation
places on interstate commerce and the local benefits the law seeks to achieve. Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
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In Hicklin, the Court referred to a "mutually reinforcing
relationship" between the two clauses based on their roots in the
170
Articles of Confederation and "their shared vision of federalism.'
In addition, the dormant Commerce Clause precludes activities by
17
local governments that interfere with interstate commerce.
However, where a state or local government participates in, rather
than regulates, a market, such activity is exempted from dormant
Commerce Clause analysis: "when a state or local government enters
the market as a participant
it is not subject to the restraints of the
72
Commerce Clause."
In many cases, a fine line divides discrimination that invokes Article
IV, Section 2 rather than the dormant Commerce Clause. The
question of which provision applies certainly does not center on
whether an activity is commercial: as cases discussed previously in
Part II illustrate, state statutes affecting nonresident access to
commercial or economic benefits, such as licenses for shrimp fishing,
fall within the scope of Privileges and Immunities analysis.'73
Where state action involving commercial activity is at issue, both
the Privileges and Immunities Clause and the dormant Commerce
Clause could be relevant, although the protections provided by each
are not identical. In certain circumstances, one line of cases may act
to invalidate a statute even if the other would allow it. For example,
in United Building & Construction Trades Council v. City of Camden,
the Court noted that although the city's hiring statute would fall
within the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine's "market participant"
exception, analysis under Article IV, Section 2 could proceed.' 74 And,
in a recent Ninth Circuit case, the court turned to the dormant
Commerce Clause to invalidate a differential fee structure for
nonresident hunters which, after Baldwin, could not be challenged on
Article IV, Section 2 grounds. 75 Therefore, each clause is likely
170. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 531-32 (1978); see also Sunstein, supra note
68, at 32-33 ("Both clauses are aimed at partiality in the form of discrimination
against out-of-staters. Both focus on the theme of representation-justifying an
active judicial posture when discrimination alerts courts to the likelihood that
unrepresented people have been harmed."); Jide Nzelibe, Free Movement: A
Federalist Reinterpretation, 49 Am. U. L. Rev. 433, 436 (1999) ("Some limitations,
such as the dormant Commerce Clause and the Comity Clause, limit the powers of
states against other states or against the federal government in order to promote a
political, social, and economic union.").
171. Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951) (invalidating a municipal
milk pasteurization statute that discriminated against out-of-state dairies where
"reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives" existed).
172. White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204, 208 (1983)
(citations omitted).
173. See Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
174. United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. City of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 220
(1984). "[Cjoncern with comity cuts across the market regulator-market participant
distinction that is crucial under the Commerce Clause." Id.
175. Conservation Force, Inc. v. Manning, 301 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2002). "Although
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relevant to beach access restrictions where both commercial and
recreational issues may arise.
Courts apply rigorous scrutiny under the dormant Commerce
Clause in cases where "a state [mandates] that its residents be given a
preferred right of access, over out-of-state consumers, to natural
resources located within its borders."'7 6 If a public beach can be
characterized as a "natural resource," a heightened level of scrutiny
would result. 77 Consequently, the nonresident restriction must be
narrowly tailored to further a legitimate
governmental interest, with
7
no less-discriminatory means available.1 1
However, in an era marked by the Supreme Court's restrictive view
on what activities do in fact substantially affect commerce,7 9
successfully linking a local restriction on beach access to interstate
commerce inquiry becomes more challenging. Therefore, Article IV,
Section 2 becomes more important in examining restrictions on
activities that may appear recreational, rather than commercial, but
that nevertheless discriminate based on nonresident status and affect
relations between the various states. The Supreme Court has said that
the primary consideration for invoking Article IV, Section 2 should be
parity of treatment, not commercial activity.'' Some point to the
introductory language of the "privileges and immunities" provision in
the Articles of Confederation, which spoke of "mutual friendship and
intercourse" among residents of the various states, to support such an
interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause that extends
beyond economic activities.'"'
While a close relationship exists between the Commerce Clause and
Article IV, Section 2, the Clauses are employed in case law to address
somewhat different aspects of the same underlying goal. Therefore,
the Commerce and Privileges and Immunities Clauses have a mutually reinforcing
relationship .. , the analytical framework for addressing challenges under each clause
is not identical." Id. at 993 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
176. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 576
(1997) (finding a tax structure that benefits camps primarily serving state residents to
violate the dormant Commerce Clause) (quoting New England Power Co. v. New
Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 338 (1982)); see also Conservation Force, 301 F.3d at 995-96.
177. See Camps, 520 U.S. at 576-77.
178. Conservation Force, 301 F.3d at 995 (citing Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S.
941, 957-58 (1982)). In Conservation Force, the court found that nonresident hunting
restrictions in Arizona satisfied the legitimate interests inquiry because of the need to
meet conservation goals. Id. at 997. However, the nonresident restriction was not
narrowly tailored because the state failed to demonstrate that other remedies that do
not discriminate were not available. Id. at 998.
179. See, e.g., Sally F. Goldfarb, The Supreme Court, The Violence Against Women
Act, and the Use and Abuse of Federalism, 71 Fordham L. Rev. 57, 110-16 (2002)
(describing shifts in the Court's interpretation of the Commerce Clause).
180. "it is discrimination against out-of-state residents on matters of fundamental
concern which triggers the Clause, not regulation affecting interstate commerce."
United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. City of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 220 (1984).
181. See Tribe, supra note 27, § 6-37, at 1260.
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while examining the relationship between the Privileges and
Immunities Clause and the Commerce Clause provides a better
understanding of the underlying objectives of each, the protections of
Article IV, Section 2 should not be limited to those interests that are
economic or commercial in nature.
C. Land Resources, Local Government Ownership, and the Privileges
and Immunities Clause
Part II.A.2 examined the tests employed by courts to determine
whether a particular activity or right falls within the scope of Article
IV, Section 2. Additionally, because beach access restrictions often
involve property owned or operated by a municipal government
(rather than the state itself), two further questions arise regarding the
scope of Privileges and Immunities protections. Part II.C.1 discusses
the Supreme Court's determination that municipal regulation falls
within the purview of the Privileges and Immunities Clause even
though Article IV, Section 2 refers to the rights of state citizenship.
Part II.C.2 then examines several Privileges and Immunities cases that
involved access to commonly-held property, and argues that state
ownership of a resource should not preclude application of Article IV,
Section 2 to beach access regulations.
1. Municipal Regulation and Article IV, Section 2
The text of Article IV, Section 2 refers to "Citizens of each State"
' 2
and "the Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States."'
Would this constitutional provision invalidate beach access
restrictions imposed by a town such as Beachville against this Note's
hypothetical nonresident, Rachel'? Could a plaintiff like Brenden
Leydon, as a resident of Connecticut, bring an Article IV, Section 2
claim against Greenwich?
In 1984, the Supreme Court used the Article IV, Section 2,
Privileges and Immunities Clause to invalidate a municipal statute
requiring that residents of Camden, New Jersey fill forty-percent of
contractor and subcontractor positions on city construction projects." 3
Writing for the Court, Justice Rehnquist determined that "[t]he fact
that the ordinance in question is a municipal, rather than a state, law
does not somehow place it outside the scope of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause.' ' 4
182. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2 (emphasis added).
183. United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 465 U.S. at 208. After discussing the
applicability of the Privileges and Immunities Clause to municipal acts, the Court then
applied the two-step test set forth in Baldwin, finding pursuit of a common calling to
be fundamental to preservation of national unity, and no substantial relationship
between the problem identified by the legislature and the statutory restrictions. Id. at
219, 222.
184. Id. at 214.
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Addressing the argument that the purpose and language of Article
IV, Section 2 is restricted to state action, the Court responded that a
municipal statute excluding nonresidents would deny an out-of-state
visitor the parity of treatment required by the Clause in the same way
that a statewide prohibition would.1 15 However, such a challenge must
be brought by an out-of-state resident, for the Court found that
residents of the state in question can object only "at the polls."' 86
Therefore, while Rachel, this Note's hypothetical visitor to
"Beachville," could as a resident of State X challenge a municipal
beach restriction in State Y using the Privileges and Immunities
Clause, she could not do so in her home state." 7 Such a result is
certainly unsettling where a right of equal treatment is extended to
residents of forty-nine other states, but not to most residents of the
very state where the city or town that retained an activity or benefit
for its citizens is located.'
If discrimination against nonresidents is
unconstitutional in the interstate context, then, logically, one would
predict that such exclusion is inappropriate in all cases. However, the
opposite result is found in Camden, illustrating one drawback of
pursuing an Article IV, Section 2 claim if remedies are available that
provide a broader scope of protection.
2. Land Resources Under Article IV, Section 2
Several Supreme Court opinions refer to special considerations
under Article IV, Section 2 in cases involving property held in
common by the people. In Corfield, Justice Washington posited that
legislatures need not provide nonresidents the same level of access to

185. Id. at 217.
186. Id.
187. Interestingly, the Court's opinion in Camden explains that an individual
visiting another state need not be treated as an average resident of New Jersey, but
can challenge a statute that prevents him or her from "enjoy[ing] the same privileges
as the New Jersey citizen residing in Camden." Id. (emphasis added).
188. Justice Blackmun dissented in Camden because he believed that Article IV,
Section 2 should not apply to municipal actions, and pointed to "the perverse effect of
vesting non-New Jersey residents with constitutional privileges that are not enjoyed
by most New Jersey residents themselves." Id. at 230 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Some commentators turn to the Fourteenth Amendment to identify a potential
constitutional challenge to remaining intrastate disparities. John Harrison argues
that, as an "equality-based," rather than substantive, protection, the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment should serve to level the intrastate
playing field when discrimination among residents of the same state exists. See
Harrison, supra note 20, at 1387-88 ("The main point of the clause is to require that
every state give the same privileges and immunities of state citizenship-the same
positive law rights of property, contract, and so forth-to all its citizens."); see also
Smith, supra note 93, at 356-57 (arguing that if Article IV, Section 2 establishes parity
between residents and visiting nonresidents of a given state, then the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ensures equal treatment of
residents of the same state, as well as conferring substantive rights).
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common property as residents." 9 Over a century later, the Court cited
Justice Washington's opinion regarding land held in trust: "It appears
to have been generally accepted that ...[the States] were not obliged
9
to share those things they held in trust for their own people."' 0
However, the historical examples given by the Court in Baldwin to
illustrate this principle relate primarily to wildlife, such as access to
oyster beds 9' and birds that are hunted, 2 rather than access to public
property for reasons other than harvesting or hunting animals.
Jonathan Varat has examined the relationship between the
Privileges and Immunities Clause and issues of "proprietary choice"
where common property is involved. 93 He argues that while a state's
ownership of property may allow for a certain amount of nonresident
discrimination in access, property ownership is not a dispositive factor
that excludes analysis under the Clause.' 94 To illustrate how a rigid
distinction that precludes Privileges and Immunities protection where
property is at issue conflicts with the nation-building objectives of the
Clause, Varat poses a hypothetical scenario in which California
restricts beach access to its own residents.'95 Varat puts forth the
California beach question with only a brief analysis of whether it
could be upheld, under the assumption that the hypothetical beach
closure blatantly contradicts our normative understanding of the
treatment that should be afforded nonresidents in a nation comprised
of states.

189. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).
190. Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 384 (1978). In Baldwin, the
Court went on to outline potential limitations on state ownership, including cases
where denying a resource to nonresidents interferes with interstate commerce, federal
power, or one's ability to earn a living in the state. Id. at 385-86.
191. McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876) (holding that a state may reserve for
its residents the exclusive right to use its oyster beds).
192. Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 384-85. But see Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Three Human
Rights in the Constitution of 1787, at 177 (1956). Chafee discusses circumstances
before the Founding at which time colonies could not prevent subjects of the King in
other colonies from fishing or other coastal commercial activity.
193. Varat, supra note 27, at 495-99.
194. Id. Varat traces the Court's discussion of this topic from McCready to Toorner
in terms of the relevance of state "ownership" of the seaboard and tidelands to
nonresident access restrictions (for oyster planting and shrimping, respectively). He
concludes:
Perhaps the most that can be said about state proprietary power over
natural resources is (1) that the privileges and immunities clause grants no
exception from the normal antidiscrimination rule when a state has no
greater claim to ownership than a regulatory power over in-state resources
possessed by no one; and (2) when a state's claim of ownership conforms
more closely to traditional forms of private ownership, some undefined
proprietary interest gives the state somewhat greater power than it would
otherwise have to discriminate against the citizens of other states, but not
complete immunity from scrutiny.
Id. at 498.
195. Id. at 511-12.
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Thus, because of the national unity objectives of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause, property ownership should not be enough,
standing alone, to justify exclusion. 9 A state may attempt to support
its rationale for excluding nonresidents from beachfront property by
pointing to the nature of commonly held property.
However,
indications from the Court, and conventional norms regarding the
need to share access to limited resources, both suggest that the
government's status as property owner should not foreclose analysis
under the Privileges and Immunities Clause in a nonresident beach
access case.
III. A RISING TIDE: THE EXISTING AND PREFERRED ARTICLE IV,
SECTION 2 TESTS APPLIED TO BEACH ACCESS RESTRICTIONS
The previous section describes the evolution of the Supreme
Court's Article IV, Section 2 analysis, including the Court's creation
of a threshold test in Baldwin v. Fish & Game Commission, which
held that "[o]nly with respect to those 'privileges' and 'immunities'
bearing upon the vitality of the Nation as a single entity must the State
treat all citizens, resident and nonresident, equally."' 7 Despite
criticism of the Baldwin "fundamental" rights and activities analysis
under the Privileges and Immunities Clause,' the test endures.
Therefore, Part III applies the Baldwin test to the case of
nonresident beach access restrictions and demonstrates that
restrictions like those in "Beachville," which entirely exclude
nonresidents, should be struck down under Article IV, Section 2. This
analysis of the beach access question also illustrates the underlying
problems with the Court's current Privileges and Immunities test.
Part III concludes by describing and applying a more workable and
reasonable analysis that should be employed in place of the Baldwin
test. The preferred Privileges and Immunities analysis eliminates the
threshold test of "fundamental" rights, and instead would require
local governments to quantify a particular nonresident harm, and to
then show a substantial relation between that harm and the extent to
which a restriction excludes nonresidents. The test proposed in this
Note better reflects the nation-building objectives of Article IV,
Section 2, and recognizes that local governments are better equipped
to quantify a particular harm than to predict which rights and
activities are "fundamental" to national unity.

196. See United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. City of Camden, 465 U.S. 208,
221 (1984); Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 528-29 (1978) (citing Baldwin, 436 U.S. at
385).
197. Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 383.
198. See supra notes 150-54 and accompanying text.
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A. Application of the Existing "Fundamental"Activities Test
Beach access restrictions may, at first glance, seem vulnerable to the
judicial treatment elk-hunting received in Baldwin.'9 9 Like elkhunting, the motivation behind a trip to the beach is usually social or
recreational, rather than commercial. For example, citing Baldwin's
holding regarding elk-hunting's "recreational" nature, the Ninth
Circuit considered a differential fee structure for mooring rights in a
recreational boat harbor, and upheld the higher nonresident fees. 00
However, the "Beachville" hypothetical and the restrictions
Brendon Leydon encountered in Greenwich differ from the situation
in Baldwin and in Hawaii Boating Association.2"" While the Court
emphasized in Baldwin that nonresidents of Montana could continue
to hunt elk in the state, albeit after paying a higher fee than
residents,'" an outright ban on nonresidents passing the entrance gate
to access the beach should produce a different result. Greenwich not
only excluded nonresidents entirely, but also prevented a nonresident
of the town from passing a boundary that members of the public
residing in Greenwich could cross freely." 3 The resulting nonresident
199. See supra notes 123-30 and accompanying text.
200. Haw. Boating Ass'n v. Water Transp. Facilities Div., Dep't. of Transp., 651
F.2d 661, 666-67 (9th Cir. 1981): see also Daly v. Harris, 215 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1109-11
(D. Haw. 2002) (finding access to the Hawaii shoreline not sufficiently "fundamental"
as defined by the Court in Baldwin).
201. Haw. Boating Ass'n, 651 F.2d 661.
202. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
203. The extent to which government can restrict freedom of movement is an area
of debate which invokes the first (free ingress and egress) and third (the right to
relocate one's residence) elements of the right to travel, as well as other constitutional
provisions including the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Denying nonresidents access to a town beach may also
involve a restriction on mobility, such as where a nonresident jogger like Brenden
Leydon is stopped at the beach entrance. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
"Free movement" issues could be explored, but disagreement exists regarding the
extent and source of the right to move without regulatory hindrance. Courts have not
identified exactly what type of movement is protected by the U.S. Constitution, and
no clear delineation of the source of any available protections exists. See Andrew C.
Porter, Comment: Toward a Constitutional Analysis of the Right to Intrastate Travel,
86 Nw. U. L. Rev. 820, 821 (1992) (arguing that the source of the right to interstate
and intrastate travel can be found in the "substantive prong" of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). Porter points to the Supreme Court's
reference to "activities that are historically part of the amenities of life as we have
known them," such as "walking, strolling, wandering, and loafing" which would point
to a prohibition against restrictions on free movement. Id. at 820 n.5 (citing
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 164 (1972)).
However, for an in-state plaintiff like Leydon, a spiit exists among the federal
circuits on the question of intrastate travel based on the right to interstate travel. Id.
at 821; see also Hyland, supra note 98, at 238. The Third Circuit examined an anticruising statute and found the right to intrastate travel in the Due Process Clause in
Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255, 266 (3d Cir. 1990), and the Fifth Circuit resolved a
challenge to a curfew ordinance based on a "fundamental right" to free movement in
Qutb v. Strauss, II F.3d 488, 495-96 (5th Cir. 1993). However, other decisions, in
examining questions regarding the rights of state residents to re-settle in their state
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discrimination affects the ability of individuals to access public areas
in neighboring states, and prevents the development of intrastate
relations and resource-sharing. Therefore, beach access restrictions
differ from the hunting licenses found by the Court to fall outside of
the scope of Article IV, Section 2 protections.
The difference between total exclusions and the fee differential in
Baldwin supports a finding that access restrictions as in "Beachville"
contradict the nation-building goals of Article IV, Section 2 to an
extent that satisfies the Court's threshold test. In cases after Baldwin,
such as United Building & Construction Trades Council v. City of
Camden, °4 when a restriction bears sufficiently on national unity to
invoke Article IV, Section 2, courts examine whether a substantial
reason exists for the nonresident discrimination, and whether the
"degree" of discrimination relates closely to that reason. 20 5 Part III.B
applies these elements of the test to the example of beach access and
describes an alternative method to distinguish among activities and
rights protected under Article IV, Section 2.
B. Chartinga New Course:Applying a PreferredPrivilegesand
Immunities Test
The threshold test established in Baldwin206 focuses on the nature of
the activity regulated by state or local government, rather than the
extent to which nonresident exclusion results. This test can exclude
activities that, despite their underlying recreational motivation, do in
fact bear upon national unity. Restrictions that prevent nonresident
access altogether can interfere with relations between the states and
their residents. A test that evaluates the nonresident barrier and the
rationale for its enactment, regardless of the character of the
underlying activity, better serves the nation-building objectives of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause.
For example, while beach access involves primarily recreational
activities, a total exclusion disrupts more than an individual's leisure
time. Excessive restrictions impair economic activity, the sharing of
resources found in a particular state, and the interaction of diverse
and to access public housing or employment, have found no constitutional protection
for intrastate travel. See Wright v. City of Jackson, 506 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1975).
While the free movement issue relates to certain aspects of the right to "travel,"
mobility restrictions as examined by the federal circuits apply to residents and
nonresidents alike. Therefore, a discussion of free movement lies outside of the focus
of this Note: the second component of the right to travel located in Article IV, Section
2, which applies to the treatment of temporary visitors by states where they do not
reside.
204. 465 U.S. 208 (1984).
205. Id. at 222.
206. "Only with respect to those 'privileges' and 'immunities' bearing upon the
vitality of the Nation as a single entity must the State treat all citizens, resident and
nonresident, equally." Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 383 (1978).
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populations in public spaces. The recreational aspects of beach access
do not negate this activity's relationship to the federal structure of
government.
The preferred Article IV, Section 2 inquiry would not examine
Instead, courts
whether the regulated activity is "fundamental."
would proceed to the inquiry applied in United Building &
Construction v. City of Camden to identify the "peculiar" problem
created by nonresident access, and then determine if the resulting
rules relate substantially to the burden imposed by visitors.z :
Therefore, even if the activity is recreational in nature, the state or
local government must demonstrate that the restriction relates
substantially to addressing the specified problem so that nonresident
status does not form the entire basis for exclusion.
In past cases, the Court suggested that the end result of a given
restriction is relevant, resolving Toomer after observing that the fee
differential functioned as an essential ban, and conversely,
emphasizing that the fee differential in Baldwin did not.21" This aspect
of the analysis should constitute an explicit component of an Article
IV, Section 2 analysis that compares the objectives of the
governmental body in restricting nonresident access to a resource
against the extent of the resulting restriction.
1. Identifying the "Peculiar" Threat Posed by Nonresident Access
Local governments are equipped to describe the additional burden
on state resources that nonresidents impose, and can quantify how a
given measure will lessen the burden."" In the case of beach access, or
other activities where conservation issues come into play,21
quantifiable factors exist for analyzing what additional or particular
danger nonresidents pose to the beach resource. 211 As Varat argues,
207. United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 465 U.S. at 222 (quoting Toomer v.
Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 398 (1948)).
208. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
209. See David J. Brower, Access to the Nation's Beaches: Legal and Planning
Perspectives 53-56 (1978). Brower identifies the following components as necessary
to maintain local beaches once access is provided: maintenance (including trash
receptacles, anti-littering signage, staff for enforcing regulations and supervising
beachgoers' activities, lifeguards, etc.); environmental protections (guarding against
the use of off-road vehicles, beach "stabilization" techniques, determination and
enforcement of beach capacity, and dune protection); transportation and parking
("parking limitations, air quality and noise implications, and the fact that new
highways inevitably bring new development and may merely complicate existing
problems"). Id.
210. See Simson, supra note 67, at 400. Simson proposes such a test in terms of
hunting licenses for nonresidents: "If the state can show that the prohibition or ceiling
is part of' a conservation effort carefully calculated to maintain the population of the
hunted species, the discrimination survives. If it cannot, the law must fall." Id.
211. See Varat, supra note 27, at 530-31. Varat would require an examination of a
resource's abundance, and the need among nonresidents for access to the resource, in
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the inquiry should first examine the availability of the resource.2 2
Further, this Note argues that the analysis should include an
examination of potential threats to the resource: overcrowding, sand
erosion, litter, and overburdening amenities such as parking and
restroom facilities.2 13
The Court conducted a similar analysis in Toomer, and determined
that nonresidents looking for shrimp used the same methods and
equipment as residents." 4 Therefore, nonresidents did not pose a
"peculiar" type of harm, and the Court invalidated the restriction.2 15
In most instances, nonresidents will use beach resources in the same
manner as residents, causing no "peculiar" type of harm. However, in
the example of beach access, nonresidents may in some circumstances
damage the resource more than residents, such as by driving and
parking when town residents walk or use forms of public
transportation to access the shore.
Also, in specific cases where a local resource is so limited in size
that it cannot accommodate use beyond the residents of the town
responsible for its operation, nonresidents may in fact pose a peculiar
harm that can be captured in an analysis of lost value due to
overcrowding.
Including this factor in the analysis would
acknowledge the concerns of local governments if providing access to
nonresidents raises fears of both diminished enjoyment and exclusion
among those who live in the community that owns and operates the
beach.
The proposed inquiry would take into account local concerns
regarding the potential for nonresidents to threaten the character of
an exclusive town resource, or to reduce its value for residents
because of overcrowding, to the extent that such issues can be
quantified in terms of attendance figures and available amenities.2 1
By requiring the town to provide a concrete measure of the costs
associated with nonresident access, restrictions that confront an actual
harm can be tailored to address local concerns, while those that simply
intend to maintain an "exclusive" or unnecessarily restrictive
environment would not fare well under the proposed test.2" 7
determining whether nonresident restrictions should apply. From these guidelines he
concludes that state beaches and parks should not be restricted to only state residents.
Id. at 530-33, 558.
212. Id.
213. See supra note 209.
214. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 403 (1948).
215. Id.
216. It should be noted that, in the case of' Greenwich, even after extensive
publicity surrounding the Leydon case and the court's decision to open Greenwich
Point to nonresidents, the town released figures which revealed that less than two
percent of those entering the municipal beach were not residents of Greenwich. See
Thanawala, supra note 15, at B1.
217. In Greenwich, the statute which limited beach access to town residents
referred to the fact that local tax dollars supported and constructed areas such as
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2. The Scope of the Nonresident Restriction
After identifying the particular harm that prompted concern and
regulation, courts should next consider the level of exclusion chosen
by the government in light of the harm. If the problems produced by
nonresidents merely create an additional financial burden on local
taxpayers, then the collection of additional financial resources through
user fees may be appropriate -without excluding nonresidents
entirely.2 18
If nonresidents create particular problems because the impact of
their use of the resource differs from local residents, then the resulting
regulation should relate substantially to that harm. An outright ban
need not automatically result. Alternatives such as a lottery or firstcome/first-served process for obtaining a predetermined number of
nonresident passes could, in many instances, resolve the burden of
expanded access.
By analyzing the additional costs and burdens that nonresident
access brings, measured against the type of discrimination enacted,
courts would reach more consistent and reasonable results than under
the Baldwin test. Using the preferred test, local governments need
not predict, using limited case law, whether a regulated activity is
"fundamental" to the structure of the federal system of government.
As this Note argues in applying Article IV, Section 2, beach access
restrictions involve more than the ability to swim or walk on an
exclusive beach. Instead, one state entirely excluding nonresidents
from passing boundaries and accessing property that in-state residents
enjoy freely raises fundamental questions regarding the relations
among the residents of the several states.
Excluding certain activities from protection under Article IV,
Section 2, and thereby permitting nonresident discrimination without
requiring justification by the local government, undermines the
Greenwich Point, as well as the "limited capacity," and the potential for "ecological
destruction" at town beaches and other recreational centers. Leydon v. Town of
Greenwich, 777 A.2d 552, 558 n.5 (Conn. 2001) (citing the invalidated Greenwich
Mun. Code § 7-36). However, based on the affluent character of Greenwich, accounts
of the court battle over beach access addressed the socio-economic divide between
the town and neighboring cities and states. See David M. Herszenhorn, Greenwich
Cites Fear of 'Jerseyfication' in Beach Dispute, N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 2000, at BI
("[The town's brief] seemed to strike an emotional blow, raising the specter of tacky
Jersey Shore honky-tonks somehow taking root in the refined quarters of Greenwich,
one of the most exclusive suburbs in America."). But, other residents insisted that
"regular people" used the town's beaches, and emphasized the need to protect limited
municipal resources. See David M. Herszenhorn, After a Court Ruling, Clouds at the
Beaches, N.Y. Times, July 28, 2001, at Bl. Certainly, care must be exercised in
applying the test advocated in this Note to distinguish between quantifiable threats to
beach resources and an underlying resistance to granting outsiders access to exclusive
resources.
218. See supra Part II.A.3.
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underlying nation-building objectives of the Clause. The Court's
Privileges and Immunities Clause test in Baldwin may be framed to
measure the impact of various restrictions on national unity, but, as
previously applied, can exclude activities like access to natural
resources that directly relate to the effective and productive
functioning of the federal system.
As state and local governments further attempt to exclude
nonresidents from accessing land resources, the limitations of the
Court's Privileges and Immunities jurisprudence will become more
evident. A more practical and efficient test would examine any
instance of differential treatment, and would prevent discrimination
against nonresidents who visit another state where local governments
fail to justify the scope of restrictions that purportedly protect and
preserve particular natural resources in local communities.
CONCLUSION

Efforts to limit access to publicly-owned natural resources, such as
municipal beaches, will continue as overcrowding in urban and
suburban neighborhoods extends into oceanfront communities.
Examining nonresident beach restrictions under Article IV, Section 2
of the U.S. Constitution (the Privileges and Immunities Clause),
which ensures that a resident of State A is treated as a "welcome
visitor ' 219 while in State B, 221' demonstrates that the Privileges and
Immunities Clause should invalidate restrictions that discriminate
based solely on nonresident status.
Analysis of nonresident beach restrictions under the current Article
IV, Section 2 framework reveals the shortcomings of the Court's
threshold test of whether the privilege or immunity in question is
"fundamental" to national unity. 221 However, even as currently
applied by courts, the recreational aspects of beach access, and the
involvement of commonly-held property, need not remove
nonresident restrictions from constitutional analysis under the Article
IV, Section 2, Privileges and Immunities Clause. Where beach access
restrictions ban nonresidents entirely, such restrictions diverge from
the differential fee structures previously upheld by courts for other
recreational activities. Even under the Court's analysis in Baldwin,
outright nonresident beach restrictions should not survive
constitutional analysis.
A preferred Article IV, Section 2 test would eliminate examination
of the restricted activity's character, and would instead consider only
if nonresidents produce a particular harm and whether the nature and
scope of the exclusionary measure relates substantially to that harm.
219. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 501 (1999).
220. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948).
221. Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 388 (1978).
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Using a proposed revised test, this Note argues that in some cases
local governments could impose a fee differential, but only in rare
situations would an outright ban on nonresident access to natural
resources like public beaches be appropriate.

Notes & Observations

